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A R B I T R AT I O N
Can an Arbitrator Be Given the Authority to Decide Whether  
an Agreement to Arbitrate Is Enforceable?
CASE AT A GLANCE 
Antonio Jackson, an employee of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., brought a lawsuit against Rent-A-Center 
alleging race discrimination and retaliation. When Rent-A-Center asserted that the action was subject to an 
arbitration agreement, Jackson argued that the court and not the arbitrator should determine whether the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
Docket No. 09-497
Argument Date: April 26, 2010
From: The Ninth Circuit
by Jay E. Grenig
Marquette university Law School
ISSUE
Must a district court rather than an arbitrator decide claims that an 
arbitration agreement is unconscionable even though the parties as-
signed this “gateway” issue to the arbitrator for decision?
FACTS
Respondent Antonio Jackson was an employee of Rent-A-Center West, 
Inc. On February 1, 2007, he filed a complaint in the u.S. District 
Court for the District of Nevada alleging race discrimination and 
retaliation by Rent-A-Center in violation of 42 u.S.C. § 1981. Rent-A-
Center moved to dismiss the court proceedings and compel arbitra-
tion. Rent-A-Center relied on a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims 
that Jackson had signed as a condition of his employment when he 
was initially hired. The agreement specifically includes claims for dis-
crimination in the list of claims that must be resolved by arbitration.
The Agreement also states:
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or 
agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute 
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability 
or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited 
to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or 
voidable.
Rent-A-Center argued that, in light of this provision, the threshold 
question of whether the arbitration agreement was valid and enforce-
able was for an arbitrator, not the court, to decide. In response, Jack-
son argued that the agreement was unconscionable—that is, that it 
was so unfair that a court must, in good conscious, refuse to enforce 
it. In particular, he contended that the agreement was substantively 
unconscionable because it contained one-sided coverage and discov-
ery provisions and a provision specifying that the arbitrator’s fee  
was to be equally shared by the parties. Jackson also argued the 
agreement was procedurally unconscionable because the form 
contract was presented to him as a nonnegotiable condition of his 
employment.
The district court granted Rent-A-Center’s motion to dismiss the 
judicial proceedings and to compel arbitration. The court found that 
the agreement to arbitrate “clearly and unmistakably provides the ar-
bitrator with the exclusive authority to decide whether the agreement 
to arbitrate is enforceable.” The district court held that “the question 
of arbitrability is for the arbitrator.” The district court also held that 
even if it were to reach the merits of Jackson’s assertion that the 
agreement was unconscionable, Jackson had not demonstrated that 
the agreement was substantively unconscionable.
Jackson appealed to the u.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Rent-A-Center once again argued that the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate must be determined by an arbitrator in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement. Jackson did not dispute that the language of 
the agreement clearly assigns the arbitrability determination to the 
arbitrator. He did dispute that he meaningfully agreed to the terms 
of the form agreement, which he contended was procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that when a party specifi-
cally challenges arbitration provisions as unconscionable and hence 
invalid, whether the arbitration provisions are unconscionable is 
an issue for the court to determine by applying the relevant state 
contract law principles. 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009). The court said 
this rule applies even if the agreement’s express terms delegate that 
determination to the arbitrator. 
The Supreme Court granted Rent-A-Center’s petition for review. 130 
S. Ct. 1133 (2010).
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CASE ANALYSIS
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that agreements to 
arbitrate disputes “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.” 9 u.S.C. § 2. While the FAA expresses a “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. 
v. Randolph, 531 u.S. 79 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
federal law “directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal 
footing with other contracts.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 u.S. 
279, 293, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002). In Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 u.S. 614, 626 (1985), the 
court said that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at 
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allega-
tion of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”
Pointing out that the FAA’s primary purpose is to enforce arbitration 
agreements in accordance with their terms, Rent-A-Center notes that 
Congress enacted the FAA to overcome historic judicial hostility to 
arbitration and replace that hostility with a liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements. Rent-A-Center argues that courts must 
enforce agreements to arbitrate in the manner provided for in the 
parties’ agreement. Where the parties clearly and unmistakably agree 
to delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, their agreement 
must be honored. According to Rent-A-Center, the Ninth Circuit disre-
garded these principles in refusing to enforce the parties’ agreement, 
on a mere assertion of unconscionability, even though the agreement 
clearly and unmistakably referred the issue of contract enforceability 
to the arbitrator in the first instance.
Rent-A-Center asserts that courts must decide whether the parties 
objectively revealed their intent to submit the arbitrability issue to the 
arbitrator. If the parties in fact were crystalline in expressing their 
intention to have enforceability issues decided by the arbitrator, Rent-
A-Center contends the courts should respect that judgment; other-
wise, those statements of intent are meaningless and the numerous 
arbitration agreements that have been entered into in reliance on 
them have been rendered equally meaningless.
Jackson, however, argues that the FAA requires enforcement only of 
arbitration agreements that are valid under state law applicable to all 
contracts. Jackson claims the Supreme Court has rejected the propo-
sition that there are no limits to what parties can agree to under the 
FAA. He contends the Court has emphatically held that parties cannot 
“contract out” of the important protections embedded in the text of 
the FAA, and that courts will not enforce provisions of arbitration 
agreements that are at odds with the textual features of the FAA. 
According to Rent-A Center, the argument that arbitrators cannot be 
trusted to rule on the validity of a contract to arbitrate runs contrary 
to the FAA’s rejection of the presumption of arbitral bias, which had 
enflamed judicial hostility to arbitration prior to the act’s passage. 
Rent-A-Center notes that Congress has been completely comfortable 
allowing arbitrators to resolve issues concerning the enforcement 
of fundamental antidiscrimination statutes. It contends there is no 
reason to believe that an arbitrator would be less capable of deciding 
whether the contract was unconscionable than whether Jackson was 
the victim of race discrimination or retaliation. The whole point of 
arbitration, Rent-A-Center concludes, is to provide a different forum 
for resolving the same substantive issues that courts decide.
Jackson responds that Rent-A-Center’s approach would prevent the 
courts from fulfilling their fundamental, statutorily required and 
time-honored role of ensuring that every arbitration clause they 
enforce meets the requirements of Section 2 of the FAA. To evade 
judicial scrutiny, a drafter could simply insert a provision stating that 
challenges to the arbitration clause’s validity are to be decided by the 
arbitrator, not the court. 
Jackson further argues that, under Rent-A-Center’s theory, the sole 
criteria for judging the validity of such a clause would be its language. 
He claims this would mean an arbitration clause must be enforced 
even if it was signed under duress. All that would matter would be 
that the clause be “clear and unmistakable.” It is Jackson’s position 
that this approach not only does violence to the FAA but also runs 
afoul of the Supreme Court’s repeated teachings that determinations 
of the validity and enforceability of an arbitration clause (as opposed 
to the contract as a whole) are for the court to decide, not the arbitra-
tor. Jackson declares that an arbitration agreement cannot stop a 
court from deciding whether the agreement is even valid.
In sum, Rent-A-Center concludes there is no dispute that (1) Jackson 
signed the Arbitration Agreement, (2) it covers his claims for relief, 
(3) it refers the issue of unconscionability to the arbitrator, and (4) 
it does so in clear and unmistakable language. Accordingly, Rent-
A-Center asserts the Ninth Circuit erred in refusing to enforce the 
agreement in accordance with its terms, as required by the FAA. 
Jackson, however, concludes that if Rent-A-Center were to succeed, 
there would be nothing to stop stronger parties from inserting similar 
language into other arbitration clauses that routinely appear in em-
ployment and consumer contracts. The result would be the wholesale 
elimination of the courts’ role in ensuring that arbitration clauses are 
valid and enforceable before enforcing them—a result that could not 
help but erode the public’s faith in the legitimacy and integrity of ar-
bitration as a fair and just alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court were to determine that parties 
may “contract around” the FAA’s requirement that a court ensure the 
validity of an arbitration clause before enforcing it, Jackson asserts 
that Rent-A-Center has failed to demonstrate that its delegation 
clause complies with ordinary state-law principles governing contract 
construction or that there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the 
parties agreed to delegate the threshold question of the arbitration 
clause’s validity to the arbitrator.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court has determined that “arbitration is a matter of 
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any 
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Howsam v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 u.S. 79, 83 (2002). Thus when deciding 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including 
arbitrability), courts generally should apply the ordinary state-law 
principles that govern the formation of contracts. Just as the arbitra-
bility of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question of “who has the 
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primary power to decide arbitrability” turns upon what the parties 
agreed about that matter. 
The Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of federal substantive 
arbitration law, when a party challenges the validity of a contract be-
tween the parties, but “not specifically its arbitration provisions,” the 
challenge to the contract’s validity should be considered by an arbitra-
tor, not a court. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 u.S. 440 
(2006). When, however, a party specifically challenges the validity of 
the arbitration provisions within a larger contract and apart from the 
validity of the contract as a whole, a court decides the threshold ques-
tion of the enforceability of the arbitration provisions. 
The rationale behind a rule requiring courts to make the threshold 
determination when the challenge specifically targets the validity of 
arbitration provisions is that arbitration is itself a matter of contract. 
“The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory 
submission to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that 
the … agreement does in fact create such a duty.” John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 u.S. 543, 547 (1964). A court may not compel 
arbitration until it is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” 9 u.S.C. 
§ 4. In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 u.S. 938 (1995), 
the Court stated that “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is [clear and unmistak-
able] evidence that they did so.” 
If Rent-A-Center prevails, therefore, the process of submitting a case 
to arbitration will be streamlined—reducing the role of the judiciary 
in determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable 
before deciding whether to compel arbitration. If Jackson prevails, 
employees and consumers will be encouraged to seek judicial review 
of arbitration agreements that they believe unconscionable.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law at Marquette university Law School 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Professor Grenig is the author of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution published by ThomsonReuters/West. He is a 
member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. He can be reached at 
jgrenig@earthlink.net or 414.288.5377.
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